Quel action (et avenir) pour General Motors?
For most of the 20th century, General Motors was the biggest company in the most important industry in the world. It not only led in automotive innovations, but helped define the new breed of massive, bureaucratic multinational corporations that shaped the post-war economy. It was the world?s largest car maker from 1931 to 2008, when it was surpassed by Toyota.
By the time it lost that distinction, such figures were the least of its worries ? by the fall of 2008, despite two years of steep cutbacks, G.M. found itself on the brink, reduced to begging the federal government for the cash it needed to stay afloat. Its chairman, Rick Wagoner, calculated that G.M. would need $18 billion from the federal government to pay its bills and restructure. The company's situation did not improve over the next several months, and Mr. Wagoner resigned on March 29, 2009 at the request of the White House.
But by the end of May 2009, the company had received more than $20 billion in federal aid and estimated that it would need tens of billions more. It declared bankruptcy on June 1, 2009.
The company that will emerge from bankruptcy will not only be a sliver of its former self, but be owned mainly by the government -- which plans to take a stake that would initially be as large as 60 percent, in return for $50 billion in bankruptcy financing. Most of the rest will be owned by bondholders and the United Auto Workers, which will receive its shares as financing for a health-care plan whose costs were formerly borne by G.M.
nationaliser puis faire bénéficier le contribuable des dividendes de la reconstruction
dans un avenir de l'économie mixte ...
GM's Bankruptcy Exposes U.S. Capitalism's Fundamental Flaws
TOKYO (Nikkei)--The bankruptcy of General Motors Corp. is a grim ending to the gripping saga of a company that went from being the epitome of U.S. manufacturing might to a towering symbol of fundamental problems with the U.S. social system and American-style capitalism.
GM pioneered many business and management practices that later became industry standards, including a divisional structure, sales finance, a corporate pension program and healthcare benefits for retired workers.
Behind the rapid spread of corporate welfare programs for employees was a surprisingly weak social security system that reflected the traditional tendency of Americans to value self-help and shun government intervention in the private sector.
Such corporate welfare programs, supported and reinforced by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, appeared to be a big victory for workers' rights.
But providing workers with respectable social security benefits for life -- a tough challenge even for the government -- is clearly beyond a company's ability.
It is easy to see how a corporate behemoth like GM, which employed over 800,000 workers in its heyday, eventually found itself under the crushing burden of mounting legacy costs.
In the meantime, the financial sector replaced the manufacturing sector as the main driving force of the U.S. economy.
American-style capitalism started seeing the maximization of shareholder value (stock prices) as the holy grail, putting relentless pressure on companies to keep boosting return on equity.
Under this business environment -- particularly harsh for manufacturers -- U.S. companies became increasingly inclined to eschew investments, which tend to be slow to produce results and often fail to do so, and concentrate on cutting costs, which are certain to improve the bottom line.
Many companies also became obsessed with making money in the merger and acquisition game and highly leveraged financial deals.
After reporting a record loss in 2005, GM in 2006 fell into a state of negative net worth -- liabilities exceeding assets. Nevertheless, the carmaker did not stop shelling out dividends until 2008, when it came to the brink of bankruptcy.
It is tempting to blame the icon's demise on the company's top executives, criticizing them for their pride, conceit, self-glorification and efforts to save their own skins.
But to be fair, it should be recognized that they were under enormous pressure from the markets.
The U.S. economy has become an arena that absorbs management resources from all over the world and provides strong incentives for companies to compete to maximize their profits.
Under this system, companies are not regarded as "going concerns" -- businesses expected to keep operating for the foreseeable future. Rather, they are seen simply as instruments for generating profits and distributing them among shareholders.
This is one extreme model of capitalism based on the notion that companies should be tested constantly for profitability so that, for the sake of overall economic efficiency, underachievers can be weeded out to make way for more profitable ones.
But the idea of making companies responsible for the welfare of workers is totally inconsistent with this system, which exposes companies to dog-eat-dog competition for maximum profitability and quickly disposes of poor performers.
The government-led bankruptcy of GM has made it clear that in the end, taxpayers have to pay a huge price for this inconsistency.
The financial crisis created by big financial institutions should not be described simply as the consequence of their failed risk management.
Similarly, it is misleading to explain GM's collapse simply as a case of gross mismanagement.
The U.S. model of capitalism is riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies, both in its practice and philosophical foundation.
It is highly doubtful whether it can serve as a universal standard.
(The Nikkei June 19 morning edition)
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